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REMOVE THE MUZZLE AND GIVE RULE 37(b) 
TEETH: ADVOCATING FOR THE IMPOSITION OF 
SANCTIONS FOR RULE 26(c) PROTECTIVE 
ORDER VIOLATIONS IN THE ELEVENTH 
CIRCUIT 
Amber M. Bishop* 
INTRODUCTION 
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) 
indicates that all the federal rules should be interpreted and 
administered to secure—as much as is feasible—a “just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination [in] every action” before the court.1 
Dockets have become increasingly crowded2 while discovery has 
simultaneously become progressively more expensive, time-
consuming, and litigious.3 In an attempt to streamline the discovery 
process,4 ease the litigating parties’ financial burden, and prevent 
disclosure of potentially embarrassing or financially damaging 
information, courts turn to protective orders.5 
Federal courts have the ability to issue 26(c) protective orders—
orders to prevent, prohibit, or limit disclosure or discovery—to 
protect a party from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
undue burden or expense.”6 Since the 1980s, judges have taken a 
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate 2015, Georgia State University College of Law. 
 1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. “The rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the 
United States district courts” but are not applicable to certain types of proceedings, including 
bankruptcy, citizenship, and proceedings involving a subpoena. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 81. 
 2. 8B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2284 (3d ed. 1998). 
 3. See Jacqueline S. Guenego, Note, Trends in Protective Orders Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(c): Why Some Cases Fumble While Others Score, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 541, 571 (1991). 
 4. 1 Steven S. Gensler, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rules and Commentary 615 (2014). “It is 
common for parties to try to streamline discovery by stipulating to discovery protections.” Id. 
 5. See Guenego, supra note 3, at 548–49, 554–55, 571. 
 6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) (noting that available methods include and are not limited to forbidding 
disclosure or discovery, specifying time or place, prescribing a specific discovery method, limiting the 
scope of discovery, or “requiring that a trade secret or . . . commercial information not be revealed or be 
revealed only in a specified way”). 
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much harsher view of sanctions for discovery violations.7 There is 
much justification for this tough stance on court-order violations: for 
instance, violations of protective discovery orders can result in the 
dissemination of confidential information,8 trade secrets, or both, to 
competitors,9 the public,10 and even potential jurors.11 In response to 
the very real possibility of financial and business harm, courts often 
turn to their power to sanction non-compliant parties for violating 
protective orders to punish and deter such behavior.12 “When 
parties . . . engage in bad faith conduct, [the] court should . . . rely on 
the Federal Rules as the basis for sanctions” where possible.13 Rule 
37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lists some possible 
sanctions the court may order if a party fails to obey a discovery 
order.14 
Rule 37(b) “authorizes sanctions for failure to comply with 
discovery orders.”15 There exists, however, a decided lack of 
consistency within the courts as to whether Rule 37(b) sanctions for 
violation of discovery orders apply to Rule 26(c) protective orders.16 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Wright, supra note 2. 
 8. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago ex rel. Emerald Inv. LP v. AXA Client Solutions, LLC, 
No. 00 C 6786, 2002 WL 1067696, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2002), aff’d, 2002 WL 1838144 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 12, 2002) (violating party used “information designated . . . as highly confidential for business 
purposes unrelated to the lawsuit”). 
 9.  Litton Indus., Inc. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 129 F.R.D. 528, 530–31 (E.D. Wis. 1990) 
(acknowledging an economic risk when a party discloses confidential and sensitive information in that 
the disclosure may ultimately provide a competitor with an unfair advantage). 
 10. Valdez-Castillo v. Busch Entm’t Corp., No. 06-20772-CIV, 2008 WL 4999175, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 
Nov. 20, 2008). In Valdez-Castillo, counsel sent confidential documents purported to contain trade 
secrets pertinent to the case, but protected within the court order, to the local newspaper, who then 
published brief excerpts and a front page article. Id. 
 11. Id. (noting that local readers of The Miami Herald, which published the confidential document 
with an accompanying front-page article, had the potential to serve as jurors). 
 12. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 
1397, 1410 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 13. Natural Gas Pipeline, 2 F.3d at 1410 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991)). 
 14. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (If a party or a party’s officer, director, or managing agent—or a 
witness designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)—fails to obey an order to provide or permit 
discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where the action is pending may 
issue further just orders). 
 15. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763 (1980). 
 16. Compare Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that a 
violation of a protective order does not fall within the scope of Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions), with Falstaff 
Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 784 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that failure to obey a 
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The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals interprets Rule 37(b)(2) very 
narrowly and precludes its application to protective order 
violations;17 other courts interpret the rule much more broadly.18 In 
jurisdictions where Rule 37 does not apply to protective orders, 
courts must deter and punish pursuant to other sources of authority.19 
These other sources of power potentially limit judges in their 
punishments.20 
Sanctions pursuant to both the court’s inherent authority and 28 
U.S.C. § 1927 (§ 1927) require detailed findings of bad faith.21 Rule 
37(b), on the other hand, requires neither bad faith nor willfulness.22 
Because of these very different standards, protective order violations 
not committed in bad faith may go unpunished in those jurisdictions 
that do not apply Rule 37(b) to protective order violations.23 This 
Note proposes that the Eleventh Circuit broaden its narrow 
                                                                                                                 
protective order exposed counsel to liability under Rule 37(b)(2)), and Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper 
Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the imposition of 37(b)(2) sanctions 
for counsel’s violation of a 26(c) order protecting confidential material was well within the court’s 
discretion). See also Joel Slawotsky, Rule 37 Discovery Sanctions—The Need for Supreme Court 
Ordered National Uniformity, 104 Dick. L. Rev. 471, 500 (2000) (noting “there is a substantial amount 
of discovery abuse that is commonplace” and “without objective criteria” provided by the United States 
Supreme Court, there will continue to be substantial uncertainty as to what “conduct warrants 
sanctions”). 
 17. Lipscher, 266 F.3d at 1323 (holding that a violation of a discovery protective order does not fall 
within the scope of Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions and reasoning that the protective order does not “provide or 
permit” discovery). In Lipscher, one company posed as a law firm in order to obtain from another 
company data, which they then sold to attorneys wishing “to calculate a statistical range of potential jury 
verdicts for different types of personal injur[y] [cases].” Id. at 1308. 
 18. Smith & Fuller, 685 F.3d at 490 (holding that the imposition of 37(b)(2) sanctions for violations 
of 26(c) protective orders fall within the court’s discretion). 
 19. Lipscher, 266 F.3d at 1323 (finding that because the district court did not invoke its inherent 
authority, the appellate court need not assess inherent authority’s applicability to the case-specific 
circumstances). 
 20. See discussion infra Part I. 
 21. Wallis v. Centennial Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 2d 909, 920 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Fink v. Gomez, 
239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001)). Detailed findings require a description of the “‘bad faith conduct 
with sufficient specificity, accompanied by a detailed explanation’ of the reasons justifying the issuance 
and the amount of the award.” Galanis v. Szulik, 841 F. Supp. 2d 456, 461 (D. Mass. 2011) (quoting 
F.A.C., Inc. v. Cooperativa de Seguros de Vida de P.R., 563 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2009)). 
 22. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). 
 23. See discussion infra Parts I–III. See, e.g., McDonald v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 186 F. App’x 
930 (11th Cir. 2006); Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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interpretation of Rule 37(b) to permit Rules-based sanctions of 
parties who violate protective discovery orders.24 
In support of this position, this Note explores the implications of 
inconsistent sanctions for Rule 26(c) protective order violations.25 
Part I examines the court’s authority to sanction for court-order 
violations and that authority’s applicability to discovery-order 
violations.26 Part II discusses discovery protective orders, their 
purpose, and the consequences of a violation.27 Part III provides an 
aerial view of Rules 37(b) and 26(c), discussing judicial decisions 
involving sanctions for protective order violations as they relate to 
sources of sanction authority.28 Part IV encourages the Eleventh 
Circuit to impose sanctions for protective order violations using Rule 
37(b) in an effort to provide certainty, consistency, and protection for 
parties before the court.29 
I.   THE LINEAGE AND BREEDS OF DISCOVERY SANCTIONS 
During the course of civil litigation in federal courts, certain 
conduct or behavior may result in sanctions, which serve to provide 
deterrence and punishment as authorized by the Federal Rules, 
                                                                                                                 
 24. As noted by Adam Fitzsimmons, the split amongst the circuits in interpreting Rule 37(b)(2) and 
its availability when protective orders are violated calls into question the ability of district courts to 
enforce protective orders. Adam Jeffrey Fitzsimmons, Note, Protect Yourself: Why the Eleventh 
Circuit’s Approach to Sanctions for Protective Order Violations Fails Litigants, 48 Ga. L. Rev. 269, 
272 (2013). 
 25. See discussion infra Parts I–IV. 
 26. See discussion infra Part II. 
 27. See discussion infra Part I. 
 28. See discussion infra Part III. Part III further expounds upon which federal circuit courts impose 
Rule 37(b) sanctions on parties who violate Rule 26(c) protective orders—exploring the role of willful 
versus inadvertent violations—with a special focus given to the states comprising the Eleventh Circuit. 
 29. See discussion infra Part III (discussing the disagreement among courts, judges, and scholars as 
to whether Rule 37 should be a viable option for courts when faced with a discovery-order violation). 
Adam Josephs from the University of Chicago contends that a narrow reading of Rule 37 is more 
appropriate, and thus, “inherent authority is currently the proper mechanism by which courts should 
enforce protective orders.” Adam M. Josephs, Comment, The Availability of Discovery Sanctions for 
Violations of Protective Orders, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1355, 1356–57 (2013). Fitzsimmons’s Note reaches 
a similar conclusion, suggesting that the Eleventh Circuit reverse its holding in Lipscher and broaden its 
interpretation of Rule 37, in spite of a different and maybe more localized analysis. Fitzsimmons, supra 
note 24, at 272, 295–96. 
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federal statutes, and the inherent authority of the court.30 Litigators 
use a vast arsenal of tools and strategies, but discovery is the “most 
often used procedural tool in the kit of the federal court 
practitioner.”31 Discovery violations occur frequently and vary in 
severity, as do the resulting sanctions.32 When discovery violations or 
failures occur, “a district court has broad discretion to withhold or 
impose sanctions, and, where sanctions are imposed, to determine 
what [those sanctions] will be.”33 The authority to impose sanctions 
for violating court orders is specifically provided for within the 
Federal Rules, federal statutes, and the inherent authority of the 
court.34 
Without question, the imposition of sanctions falls squarely in the 
vast realm of judicial discretion. 35 When the court entertains motions 
for sanctions made pursuant to the Federal Rules, as opposed to the 
court’s inherent power or § 1927,36 the court’s interpretation of the 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See Robert E. Rodes et al., Sanctions Imposable for Violations of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 1, 26, 73–74 (1981) (surveying the law, as of 1981, with respect to sanctions for violations of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 31. Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 480, 480–81 
(1958) (noting that some form of discovery is used in virtually all tort cases and “discovery procedures 
come before the courts in twenty-five per cent [sic] of the cases filed”). 
 32. David F. Herr et al., Motion Practice § 15.07 (5th ed. 2009) (noting the “wide array of sanctions 
that may be imposed for the failure to make discovery”). On one end of the sanction spectrum, sanctions 
can provide for payment of expenses by the disobedient party; at the other end of the spectrum are case-
dispositive sanctions: involuntary dismissal and default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) (listing 
sanctions for failure to comply with a court order); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (noting that “[i]f the plaintiff 
fails to . . . comply with . . . a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss . . . any claim”). 
 33. Jay A. Stephens, Civil Discovery Sanctions in the Federal Courts, 33 American Jurisprudence 
Proof of Facts 3d § 7 (2014) (footnotes omitted). Courts assess and balance a host of factors when 
choosing whether to impose sanctions upon a violating party, giving each factor “the weight most 
appropriate under the circumstances of a particular discovery failure.” Id. The nature and particular 
circumstances—particularly findings of bad faith or purposeful violations—are among those things 
considered. Id. Additionally, the courts consider the risk of prejudice resulting from the discovery 
failure, the need for specific deterrence, and the judiciary’s interest in sanctions. Id. 
 34. See Rodes et al., supra note 30, at 73–79 (including discussion of sanctions imposed according 
to Rule 37, inherent authority to hold in contempt—codified in 18 U.S.C. § 401—and the Federal Cost 
Statute— 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
 35. Herr et al., supra note 32, § 15.07[C] (noting “[t]he range of sanctions is dramatic, and courts 
have broad discretion in selecting an appropriate sanction” and this is an “opportunity to the attorney 
seeking sanctions” to “‘steer’ the court toward a sanction that is most useful”). 
 36. See infra note 47. 
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pertinent rule dictates success or failure.37 Courts are free to rely 
upon statutory or inherent authority to determine the appropriate 
sanction for behaviors or sanctions not specifically enumerated in the 
Federal Rules.38 The United States Supreme Court noted that “the 
inherent power of a court can be invoked even if procedural rules 
exist which sanction the same conduct,”39 but “[i]n situations where 
procedural rules [do] prescribe specific sanctions for discovery 
infractions, reliance on a court’s ‘inherent power’ . . . has been 
criticized.”40 In spite of this criticism, the Eleventh Circuit has 
affirmed simultaneous sanctions pursuant to § 1927, the Federal 
Rules, and inherent authority for violations of other types of 
discovery order violations; yet it finds that Rule 37 does not apply to 
protective order violations: The Eleventh Circuit therefore imposes 
sanctions for protective order violations pursuant only to inherent 
authority.41 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides for the payment of reasonable expenses 
“[i]nstead of or in addition to the orders above, . . . caused by the 
failure [to comply with discovery orders], unless the failure was 
substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1119 (2002) (noting that some lower courts have “felt free to strain 
the Rules’ text, and ignore relevant [Advisory Committee] Notes, in order to implement their own views 
of desirable policy”). Struve also asserts that “the Court should not reject authoritative sources of 
meaning in favor of its own policy” and concludes that courts “should accord the [Advisory Committee] 
Notes authoritative effect.” Id. at 1103, 1141. See also Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763–64 
(1980) (finding that “Rule 37 sanctions must be applied diligently [for failure to comply with discovery 
orders] both ‘to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, [and] to deter 
those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent’” (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976))). 
 38. Note, Proposed 1967 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 271, 293–
94 (1968). 
 39. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49 (1991). 
 40. Proposed 1967 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, supra note 38, at 293. 
 41. Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001); Malautea v. Suzuki Motor 
Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1993). The Court of Appeals upheld sanctions imposed by the 
District Court via all three mechanisms where the defendants continually, deliberately, and willfully 
resisted discovery. Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1542–47. The trial court entered a default judgment and 
assessed costs associated with the “protracted and costly discovery period” per the Federal Rules, 
ordered the defense attorneys to pay the reasonable costs and attorney’s fees resulting from their 
behavior pursuant to § 1927, and fined each defendant and defense attorney pursuant to the court’s 
inherent powers. Id. at 1541–42. 
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expenses unjust.”42 The Eleventh Circuit has said Rule 37(b)(2)(C) 
“gives district judges broad discretion . . . guided by judicial 
interpretation of the rule.”43 Is Rule 37(b) truly silent concerning an 
appropriate remedy for protective order violations, such that judicial 
reliance upon inherent authority or statutory permission is necessary 
and appropriate? The answer depends upon the individual court’s 
interpretation of Federal Rule 37(b) and subsequently, the answer to 
two additional questions: (1) does a protective order “provide or 
permit” discovery; and (2) does “fail[ing] to obey an order” require 
willfulness or bad faith?44 
A.   Breeds of Sanctions: Sources of Authority Not Based in the 
Federal Rules 
Any noncompliance with a court order can be grounds for some 
form of sanction and although the court has several available 
sanctioning mechanisms, key differences affect the viability and 
desirability of each method.45 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). 
 43. Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1542–43 (giving the examples that a “default judgment sanction requires a 
willful or bad faith failure to obey a discovery order” and “simple negligence . . . or inability to comply 
will [likely] not justify a Rule 37 default judgment or dismissal” (citing Societe Internationale pour 
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, S.A., 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958) and In re Chase 
and Sanborn Corp., 872 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989))). 
 44. See discussion infra Parts I–III. See, e.g., Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 
685 F.3d 486, 489–90 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the imposition of 37(b)(2) sanctions for violations of 
26(c) protective orders fall within the court’s discretion because a protective order provides for 
discovery by “prescribing the method and terms” to which the parties must abide); Lipscher v. LRP 
Publ’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding 37(b) sanctions are inapplicable to 
protective-order violations because a protective order falls outside of the scope of the rule as it does not 
provide or permit discovery); United States v. Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 910–12 (9th Cir. 
1986) (upholding the lower court’s compensatory sanctions against the government for violating the 
spirit of the protective order and stated that dismissal should only be imposed in extreme circumstances 
if the conduct is willful and in bad faith); Belinskey v. Clooten, 164 P.3d 1163, 1168 (Or. Ct. App. 
2007) (noting that the court held “that a party ‘refuses to obey’ simply by failing to comply with [a 
court] order”) (quoting Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S. A., 
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958))). 
 45. One requirement does not vary by mechanism: the Supreme Court clarified that a party’s right to 
due process requires notice (by the court or opposing party), and the court must grant the violating party 
an opportunity to be heard. Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1542. This restriction applies to the requisite bad faith 
determination and to assessing fees. Id. (interpreting the “Rule 37 requirement of a “‘just’ sanction to 
represent ‘general due process restrictions on the court’s discretion’” (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. 
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1.   28 U.S.C. § 1927 
Violation of a court order may result in sanctions pursuant to 
federal statute—§ 1927.46 The code section provides that “[a]ny 
attorney . . . in any court of the United States . . . who so multiplies 
the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be 
required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, 
and attorney’s fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”47 
The Eleventh Circuit finds that the statute’s “plain 
language . . . imposes three essential requirements: (1) the attorney 
must engage in unreasonable and vexatious conduct;48 (2) that 
conduct must multiply the proceedings; and (3) the amount of the 
sanction must bear a ‘financial nexus to the excess proceedings.’”49 
Discovery violations and the resulting motions have the potential 
to significantly multiply proceedings,50 and thus it seems that § 1927 
                                                                                                                 
Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 707 (1982)); see also Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 
1551, 1559–60 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussing that notice can come from the court or party seeking 
sanctions and the response can be oral or in writing); Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 29, 31 
(D. Me.1994) (“Rule 37(b) requires the disobedient party to show that its failure to comply is 
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of sanctions unjust.”). 
 46. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). 
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Section 1927 (Counsel’s Liability for Excessive Costs) should be read in 
conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (Taxation of Costs) which reads: 
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following: (1) Fees 
of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts 
necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and 
witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials 
where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) Docket fees under 
section 1923 of this title; (6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of 
interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under 
section 1828 of this title. A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, 
included in the judgment or decree. 
28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2012); see Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 760 (1980). 
 48. To determine if conduct is “vexatious,” the court must assess whether the conduct is “objectively 
‘harassing or annoying’ so that it reflects a ‘serious and studied disregard for orderly process of 
justice.’” An-Port, Inc. v. MBR Indus., Inc., 142 F.R.D. 47, 49 (D.P.R. 1992) (quoting Cruz v. Savage, 
896 F.2d 626, 632 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 49. Meidinger v. Healthcare Indus. Oligopoly, 391 F. App’x. 777, 779 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 50. William Schwarzer et al., California Practice Guide Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 
17:655 (2014) (citing Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 283 F.3d 282, 291–92 (5th Cir. 
2002)). In Lyn-Lea, the court rescheduled a hearing because counsel appeared at a scheduled contempt 
hearing without the witness, the court justified sanctions under § 1927 by stating that the attorney 
unreasonably multiplied the proceedings. Id. It logically follows that hearings regarding violated 
discovery orders could possibly be deemed to unreasonably multiply proceedings although it is more 
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could apply.51 Protective orders, when realistically drafted and 
subsequently followed, “save countless hours of judicial time and 
substantial litigation costs.”52 Litigating violations of these same 
protective orders wastes judicial resources and increases litigation 
costs, yet § 1927 has not been applied to protective order violations.53 
Section 1927 is further limited in that parties, even pro se parties, 
cannot be sanctioned under § 1927.54 The statute is singularly 
applicable to attorneys, leaving willful or vexatious conduct of the 
parties unpunished.55 
Additionally, because § 1927 sanctions are “penal in nature,”56 the 
statute must be “strictly construed” and detailed findings of bad faith 
conduct are necessary.57 The first element—unreasonable and 
vexatious conduct—is a high standard, one that often requires a 
detailed showing of bad faith.58 Section 1927 is further limited in that 
the only available sanctions are monetary: the court may award costs, 
expenses, and attorney’s fees.59 On the other hand, sanctions pursuant 
                                                                                                                 
likely courts will not do this for hearings within the same suit or same claim. Id. ¶ 17:643 (quoting 
Jensen v. Phillips Screw Co., 546 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2008)). 
 51. An exhaustive search on both WestLaw and Lexis revealed no indications where § 1927 applied 
to protective order sanctions as of August 22, 2014. 
 52. Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 2 
(1983). 
 53. Guenego, supra note 3, at 542, 571. Although § 1927 has not been specifically applied to the 
violation of court protective orders, the Southern District of Ohio noted that discovery violations subject 
the violating party to sanctions pursuant to Rule 26(g)(3), Rule 37(a), Rule 37(b), § 1927, and the 
court’s inherent power. Brown v. Tellermate Holdings Ltd., No. 2:11-CV-1122, 2014 WL 2987051, at 
*23 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2014). 
 54. Douglas J. Pepe, Persuading Courts to Impose Sanctions on Your Adversary, Litig. Winter 2010, 
at 21, 24. “If you want sanctions against a party, as opposed to your adversary, pick another rule because 
Section 1927 doesn’t apply. Sanctions are only available against lawyers, not litigants.” Id. 
 55. Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 70 F. Supp. 2d 415, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Keller v. 
Mobil Corp., 55 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1995)), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 22 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2000); 
see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 772 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Zaldivar 
v. City of L.A., 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). See supra note 48 for a definition of vexatious 
conduct. 
 56. Meidinger v. Healthcare Indus. Oligopoly, 391 F. App’x. 777, 779 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Peterson v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1396 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
 57. Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp. of Kenner, La., Inc., 38 F.3d 1414, 1416–17 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(finding that “evidence of recklessness, bad faith, or improper motive must be present”). 
 58. Pepe, supra note 54, at 24. 
 59. Seth Katsuya Endo, The Propriety of Considering an Attorney’s Ability to Pay Under § 1927, 61 
Drake L. Rev. 291, 292–93 (2013) (“Until 1980, sanctions imposed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 were 
 
9
: Remove the Muzzle and Give Rule 37(b) Teeth: Advocating for the I
Published by Reading Room, 2015
416 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2 
to the Federal Rules or the court’s inherent authority provide the 
courts more of the necessary flexibility and are undoubtedly 
applicable to the violation of protective court orders.60 
2.   Inherent Power 
Judicial power to sanction pursuant to inherent authority is the 
“quintessential gap filler,” permitting sanctions when no rule or 
statute governs the precise violative conduct or when a court wishes 
to exceed the penalties provided for by the rule or statute.61 Inherent 
power is authority necessarily vested in the courts, which allows 
them to manage judicial affairs and adjudicate claims fairly, 
effectively, and in an expeditious manner.62 The United States 
Constitution confers “[t]he judicial [p]ower,” not governed by rules 
or statues, upon all “Article III courts.”63 Specifically, courts have 
“inherent authority” to sanction attorneys for any bad faith conduct 
related to discovery order violations.64 
The power to sanction bad faith conduct pursuant to the court’s 
inherent power goes far beyond sanctioning mechanisms provided by 
the Federal Rules or § 1927.65 Some courts have found that inherent 
                                                                                                                 
limited to “excess costs and expenses, which only rarely involved significant sums.” As a result, these 
sanctions were seldom the subject of litigation. Illustrating this point, in the 150 years following its 
enactment in 1813, § 1927 was invoked in only seven reported cases. Since 1980, when Congress 
amended the section by authorizing the inclusion of attorney’s fees as part of the sanction, much greater 
use has been made of § 1927.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 60. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 61. Pepe, supra note 54, at 24. 
 62. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42 (1991); Martin v. Automobili Lamborghini 
Exclusive, Inc., 307 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 63. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; Natural Gas Pipeline Co of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397, 
1406 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 64. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46–47 (finding the ability of the Court to sanction is neither displaced nor 
limited by statute or the federal rules and instead, “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation 
abuses”); Philip Talmadge et al., When Counsel Screws Up: The Imposition and Calculation of Attorney 
Fees as Sanctions, 33 Seattle U. L. Rev. 437, 454 (2010) (noting the court may impose sanctions for 
failure to cooperate with discovery orders under the relevant rule or “under the court’s inherent 
authority”). 
 65. NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696, 703 (5th Cir. 1990). For more 
examples, see Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1119 (1st Cir. 1989); Landau & Cleary, Ltd. v. 
Hribar Trucking, Inc., 867 F.2d 996, 1002 (7th Cir. 1989); Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 
1281 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (MacKinnon, J. dissenting). 
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power is intended to reach both individuals and conduct not directly 
addressed by the Federal Rules and statutes.66 Notably, Congress’s 
promulgation of the Federal Rules does not displace a court’s 
inherent power to impose sanctions upon a party for acting in bad 
faith; however, where procedural rules provide for specific sanctions, 
reliance upon a court’s inherent power authority—as opposed to its 
procedural authority—has been criticized.67 Unlike § 1927, which 
applies only to attorneys, the court’s inherent authority is applicable 
to all parties appearing before it; the court may assess attorney’s fees 
against both attorneys and parties pursuant to its inherent power for 
“act[ing] in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive 
reasons.”68 Additionally, inherent power provides greater flexibility 
in imposing sanctions, allowing the court to respond directly to the 
harm caused and tailor the sanctions to fit the behavior.69 While 
inherent power is broad-reaching and flexible, it has its limitations. 
The court’s inherent powers are “shielded from direct democratic 
controls,” and as such the courts are cautioned to exercise “restraint 
and discretion.”70 Sanctions pursuant to the court’s inherent authority 
require an express and detailed finding by the court of bad faith; this 
includes vexatious, wanton behavior or conduct done for oppressive 
purposes.71 Express and detailed findings of bad faith present an 
obstacle, although not an insurmountable one. Unlike Rule 27, 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 2 F.3d at 1407, 1411 (noting that the Federal Rules are not the 
“exclusive source of a federal court’s powers in civil cases”). 
 67. Proposed 1967 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, supra 38, at 293–94. 
 68. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–46; see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 
U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975). 
 69. In re Mroz, 65 F.3d at 1575 (noting that “[a] primary aspect of [the discretion that flows from the 
court’s inherent authority] is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the 
judicial process” (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45)). Courts have even awarded expert witness 
fees pursuant to inherent power. Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1215 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 70. Natural Gas Pipeline, 2 F.3d at 1409 (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 
(1980)). 
 71. In re Mroz, 65 F.3d at 1575–76 (noting that where the reputation of a law firm and its attorneys 
is at stake, evidentiary hearings are appropriate and even encouraged to determine if parties acted in bad 
faith); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper 447 U.S. 752, 767 (noting that “[a] specific finding as to 
whether counsel’s conduct in this case constituted or was tantamount to bad faith . . . would have to 
precede any sanction under the court’s inherent powers”). 
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conduct must surpass equally high “bad faith” thresholds whether 
assessed under the court’s inherent powers or § 1927.72 
B.   Lineage: Federal Rule-Based Authority in Rule 37(b) 
Section 1927 has yet to be applied to protective order violations, 
and thus inherent authority and Rule 37 may very well be the only 
available avenues for deterrence and compensation. As stated, 
sanctions awarded pursuant to the court’s inherent authority require 
detailed findings of bad faith.73 Rule 37, on the other hand, has no 
bad faith or willfulness requirement and permits the court to impose 
sanctions in situations where it would be unable to do so using 
inherent authority.74 The requirements of Rule 37(b) violations are 
simply that: (1) a court order was in effect and (2) the order was 
violated.75 Rule 37 is widely applicable, grants federal courts broad 
discretion,76 and should be applied diligently to both penalize and 
deter.77 Although it is certainly within the court’s extremely broad 
discretion whether to actually impose Rule 37(b) sanctions, sanctions 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Cordoba v. Dillard’s Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1178 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 73. Wallis v. Centennial Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 2d 909, 920 (E.D. Cal. 2013); Fink v. Gomez, 239 
F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001). The Fink court held that “a district court has authority under its inherent 
power to impose sanctions when an attorney has made reckless misstatements of law and fact, and has 
done so for an improper purpose.” Fink, 239 F.3d at 990. 
 74. Valdez-Castillo v. Busch Entm’t Corp., No. 06-20772-CIV, 2008 WL 4999175, at *4–5 (S.D. 
Fla. Nov. 20, 2008). While “bad faith or willful misconduct” may be necessary in some jurisdictions to 
warrant the “severest remedies” under Rule 37(b), “lesser sanctions [generally] do not require a finding 
of willfulness”; Stephens, supra note 33, § 9. See also Chilcutt v. United States, 4 F.3d 1313, 1322 n.23 
(5th Cir. 1993) (holding that district courts have broad discretion to fashion appropriate sanctions 
against those who disobey court orders, but noting that the sanction must specifically relate to the 
misconduct at issue). 
 75. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). 
 76. Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 29, 31 (D. Me. 1994). In Poliquin, the court ordered 
counsel to destroy all documents within ninety days after the products liability litigation came to an end. 
Id. The attorney told the court reporter not to destroy the protected transcripts and data because “he 
disagreed with [the] procedure.” Id. Counsel then advised his co-counsel, in a similar case against the 
same defendant, to request a copy of the transcript from the state court reporter, who transcribed the 
deposition in Poliquin. Id. at 30. The district court then exercised its “wide discretion” and ordered the 
offending party to submit a detailed letter certifying the precise steps he had taken to ensure that the 
protected material was destroyed and that he had contacted the court reporters to direct them to destroy 
the material, indicating if he had committed other violations, and if so, describing the steps he was 
taking to rectify them. Id. at 31–33. 
 77. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763–64 (1980). 
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should certainly be applied for willful violations, bad faith, and in 
some cases even negligence, but arguably not when a party is simply 
unable to comply.78 A significant benefit to imposing sanctions 
pursuant to Rule 37—as opposed to § 1927—is that sanctions under 
the Rule are wider reaching in that they are applicable to parties and 
their counsel.79 Furthermore, the court can tailor the punishment (and 
deterrence) to the offending behavior.80 
Rule 37(b) authorizes sanctions for a party’s failure to comply with 
a court order.81 The Rule was adopted in 1937 for the very purpose of 
enforcing the discovery devices provided for in Rules 26 through 
36.82 Rule 37(b)(2)(A) provides a range of available sanctions, from 
ordering reimbursement for incurred costs to dismissing the action or 
proceeding.83 Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides for the payment of expenses 
instead of, or even in addition to, the sanctions provided for in Rule 
37(b)(2)(A).84 Courts have recognized that “without adequate 
sanctions, the procedures for discovery would be ineffectual.”85 
Discovery devices serve as a carrot, streamlining litigation and 
attempting to decrease the overall cost and burden of litigation.86 
                                                                                                                 
 78. SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., No. 5:10-CV-25-FL, 2014 WL 1760960, at * 4 
(E.D.N.C. May 1, 2014) (citing Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 503 (4th Cir. 1977)). 
 79. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). 
 80. Stuart I. Levin & Assocs., P.A. v. Rogers, 156 F.3d 1135, 1140 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that 
“Rule 37(b)(2) provides a range of sanctions that a district court may impose [in its discretion] upon 
parties and their attorneys for failure to comply with the court’s discovery orders”). In addition to 
directive and case-dispositive sanctions, Rule 37(b)(2) also provides the court discretion to advise the 
attorney or party “to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless 
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of 
expenses unjust.” Id. 
 81. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). 
 82. Fitzsimmons, supra note 24, at 274. 
 83. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vii); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). 
 84. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). 
Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, 
the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or 
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
Id. 
 85. Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting 8 Charles Alan Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2281 (3d ed. 1970)). 
 86. Gensler, supra note 4, at 615. Parties often stipulate to various discovery protections in an effort 
to streamline discovery and litigation. Id. 
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Sanctions serve as the stick accompanying that very useful carrot; yet 
the interpretation of Rule 37(b) and its applicability to Rule 26(c) 
protective orders varies greatly according to the adjudicating 
jurisdiction.87 
II.   A DOBERMAN OR POODLE JUDICIARY: PROTECTING INTERESTS 
WITH PROTECTIVE ORDERS 
Parties are given wide latitude during discovery and are permitted 
to explore any non-privileged matter “relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the [pending] action” to narrow the issues and obtain 
information leading to the discovery of admissible evidence.88 Parties 
are not, however, limited in their use or dissemination of discovery 
materials once acquired.89 In fact, the Supreme Court held that First 
Amendment freedoms apply to information gained through 
discovery, and in the absence of a court order, parties are entitled to 
disseminate the material as they wish.90 As a result, litigants are 
hesitant to disclose information to opposing parties and often 
stipulate to umbrella protective orders or petition the court for 
protective orders to limit the scope, use, disclosure, or dissemination 
of shared materials.91 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See discussion infra Part III. 
 88. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 503 (1947). 
 89. Andrea Kuperman, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Case Law on Entering 
Protective Orders, Entering Sealing Orders, and Modifying Protective Orders 4 (2010) (citing Pub. 
Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d. 775, 780 (1st Cir. 1988)), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Caselaw_Study_of_Discovery_Protective_Or
ders.pdf. 
 90. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31–36 (1984); see also Okla. Hosp. Ass’n v. 
Okla. Publ’g Co., 748 F.2d 1421, 1424 (10th Cir. 1984); Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago ex rel. 
Emerald Inv. LP v. AXA Client Solutions, LLC, No. 00 C 6786, 2002 WL 1067696, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
May 28, 2002), aff’d, 2002 WL 1838144 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2002) (parties are generally permitted to 
disseminate information obtained in discovery as they see fit, however, upon entry of a protective order, 
dissemination is limited and must comply with the terms of the protective order (citing Jepson, Inc. v. 
Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994))). 
 91. Guenego, supra note 3, at 561–62; Marcus, supra note 52, at 9. In complex litigation the parties 
customarily stipulate to “umbrella” protective devices the parties will use, such as access limits or 
storage requirements, to protect all materials designated confidential by the producing party. Marcus, 
supra note 52, at 9. Standardized protective orders are emerging due to their frequent use and ability to 
control expense and minimize delay. Id. 
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When granting a motion for a protective discovery order, courts 
must balance a variety of factors, including the moving party’s need 
for protection, the reliance interests of the producers, efficiency, 
fairness, public needs, and the potential impact upon collateral 
litigants.92 District courts have broad discretion in deciding if a 
protective order is appropriate; once good cause is demonstrated the 
court may grant an order to prevent annoyance, embarrassment, or 
undue burden.93 Protective orders are granted to protect both non-
confidential information and trade secrets or other confidential 
information.94 Essentially, protective orders allow the court to 
balance the litigant’s needs with the competing need for protection.95 
The potential harm to litigants, the public, and the judicial 
system’s interest in fairness is expansive when protected materials 
are disclosed in violation of court-ordered protection.96 To truly 
decide a case upon its merits, parties must reveal sensitive 
information. The disclosure of confidential documents should be 
made in reliance upon the protection those orders proffer, but court 
orders (and limitations) must be respected by the receiving party.97 
Protective orders themselves serve several interests: they protect 
trade secrets and confidential information, protect individual privacy, 
preserve property rights, protect reputations, and prevent parties from 
misleading the public with out-of-context or incomplete 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Kuperman, supra note 89, at 1–2. 
 93. Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 36; Coleman v. Am. Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1099 (6th Cir. 
1994). 
 94. Guenego, supra note 3, at 543–45, 553. 
 95. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, La. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 290 (D. Del. 
1985). Judges acknowledge that the disclosure of trade secrets in litigation has the potential to destroy a 
corporation’s ability to function and remain competitive. Id. Similarly, courts acknowledge that without 
an order compelling discovery, parties may be unable to make a case. Id. (citing Grasselli Chem. Co. v. 
Nat’l Aniline & Chem. Co., 282 F. 379, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1920)). Protective orders allow for a balance 
between these competing interests. 
 96. See discussion supra Part II. 
 97. Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting 
that the defendant “sought a strongly worded protective order and had vigorously moved for its 
enforcement. . . . [and opposing counsel] understood the importance of compl[iance]”). Following the 
inappropriate dissemination of the protected information, the defendant incurred significant expenses in 
its attempts to identify the violation and enforce the court order. Id. at 488. 
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disclosures.98 Litigants disclosing sensitive information can suffer 
embarrassment, adverse publicity, harm to their reputation and public 
image, and even face economic devastation when opposing parties 
violate protective orders.99 Courts have acknowledged that, upon its 
release, protected information has the potential to damage corporate 
and individual reputations, destroy personal relationships, and ruin 
entire businesses.100 Corporations often link drops in stock prices 
with public disclosure of sensitive information.101 For example, a 
manufacturer of disposable lighters sought discovery protection in a 
products liability action arising out of a cigarette lighter explosion.102 
The New York Times publicly reported some improperly disclosed 
information, and the manufacturer alleged a directly-related thirty-
three percent drop in its stock prices.103 
Cases espousing the many harms that protective order violations 
can cause are plentiful,104 but the 2007 Zyprexa Injunction serves as 
one illustration of the expansive harm a company can suffer when 
court orders are disobeyed.105 Following a settlement in a products 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Martin C. Calhoun & Rebecca A. Womeldorf, When Conspirators Defy Protective Orders: 
Lessons From In Re Zyprexa Injunction, Legal Backgrounder, Apr. 27, 2007, at 2, 3. 
 99. Marcus, supra note 52, at 1–2. 
 100. United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995). The public should not have 
unlimited access to all material resulting from discovery and litigation. Id.; see also Cipollone v. Liggett 
Grp., Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 90 (D.N.J. 1986). In Cipollone, the defendant tobacco company argued that 
disclosed information caused “wide gyrations in the values of the defendants’ stock.” Cipollone, 113 
F.R.D. at 90. The court acknowledged that the tobacco companies did show an effect on their financial 
standing, but the court required specific and particularized allegations of how specified documents 
would cause financial and competitive injury. Id. 
 101. See Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 201 (3d Cir. 1989); Cipollone, 113 F.R.D. at 90. 
 102. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d at 196–97, 202 (holding that BIC Corp. was entitled to a protective order 
preventing the plaintiff from disseminating trade secret information regarding lighter design, product 
safety, and quality control and testing information). 
 103. Id. at 201. 
 104. See, e.g., In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 355–56 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding 
order justified upon assertions that adverse publicity or intimidation could impair the information 
sharing); McLin v. City of Chicago, 133 F.R.D. 527, 528 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (suggesting information might 
inhibit citizen complaints or subvert and chill police work); Bradway v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 132 
F.R.D. 78, 79 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (revealing blood collection procedures might cause public confusion and 
a dangerous drop in the blood supply). 
 105. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), judgment entered sub nom. 
In re Zyprexa Litig., No. 07-CV-0504, 2007 WL 669797, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2007), aff’d sub nom., 
Eli Lilly &Co. v. Gottstein, 617 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2010). For a summary of the history, facts, and 
findings see Calhoun, supra note 98, at 1–4. 
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liability action against the manufacturer of a prescription drug used to 
treat schizophrenia, a plaintiffs’ expert and reporter for The New York 
Times, along with an attorney not involved in the suit, engaged in a 
conspiracy to disseminate protected materials to national 
newspapers.106 Publication of the protected documents created 
serious harm to the manufacturer by revealing valuable trade secrets, 
confidential preliminary medical research, and merchandising 
techniques.107 Disclosure of the confidential information complicated 
settlement of pending and future cases for the manufacturer and made 
impartial juror selection more difficult.108 Furthermore, the breach 
likely affected future plaintiffs’ willingness to bring suit because the 
very public breach proved that even with court-ordered protection, 
the parties faced possible public disclosure of their private and 
personal medical information.109 Ultimately, violations of the court’s 
protective order harm corporations, harm future plaintiffs’ confidence 
in the system, and weaken faith in the judiciary.110 
Eleventh Circuit case law is rampant with sanctions for various 
discovery mechanism violations. For example, the Eleventh Circuit 
routinely sanctions for failure to obey discovery orders.111 In 
Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., Inc., the court noted that it 
previously went as far as sanctioning a party in spite of the fact that 
there was “no technical violation of any particular rule.”112 Protective 
                                                                                                                 
 106. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 403; Calhoun, supra note 98, at 1. 
 107. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 429. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., Scipione v. Advance Stores Co., 294 F.R.D. 659, 665 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (imposing 
sanctions on the plaintiff for failure to timely provide complete and adequate discovery responses); 
Power Guardian, LLC v. Directional Energy Corp., No. 5:12-CV-236 (MTT), 2013 WL 3893391, at *4 
(M.D. Ga. July 26, 2013) (imposing sanction of default judgment where defendants failed to provide 
discovery or comply with the court orders to provide discovery); Signature Pharmacy, Inc. v. Soares, 
No. 6:08-CV-1853-Orl-31TBS, 2012 WL 4815726, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2012) (granting a motion 
for sanctions, including attorney’s fees and expenses, for non-disclosure and the intentional shredding of 
discoverable documents). 
 112. Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 775 F.2d 1440, 1452 n.11 (11th Cir. 1985). “[I]n Guidry we 
upheld sanctions under Rule 37 where the attorney caused unnecessary discovery expense even while 
‘no technical violation of any particular rule was made by Guidry’s counsel’ because the ‘imposition of 
sanctions in this case was in keeping with the spirit of the rules.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
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orders are not freely given;113 for a party to receive the protection of 
a court order, that party must satisfy the good cause standard, which 
means they must submit “a particular and specific demonstration of 
fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory 
statements.”114 What message is sent to litigating parties and counsel 
when failing to provide adequate or respond timely to discovery 
requests is more likely to be punished than disseminating or misusing 
sensitive, confidential, or court-order-protected documents? 
III.   USING RULE 37(B) AS GROUNDS FOR SANCTIONING PROTECTIVE 
ORDER VIOLATIONS: MOST COURTS ALLOW RULE 37 TO BARE ITS 
TEETH 
The party litigating to protect its confidential information typically 
incurs superfluous attorney’s fees and expenses in efforts to identify 
violations, alert the court, and enforce existing protective orders.115 If 
courts interpret Rule 37 as inapplicable to Rule 26 protective orders, 
an offended party’s sole method of recourse lies with the court’s 
inherent authority—requiring proof of willful misconduct or bad 
faith.116 There are two separate approaches for addressing protective 
order violations: (1) Rule 37 Sanctions and (2) sanctions pursuant to 
the court’s inherent authority. The Eleventh Circuit has chosen the 
latter based upon its interpretation of the Federal Rules. 
In an effort to assist with interpretation of the Federal Rules, the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules117 has, from its origination, 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985). The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure favor full discovery whenever possible. Id. Rule 26(c) requires the motioning party to 
show good cause, but federal courts further demand a balancing of competing interests: interests in 
obtaining the information and the competing interest of keeping that same information confidential. Id. 
 114. United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). 
 115. See Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 116. Valdez-Castillo v. Busch Entm’t Corp., No. 06-20772-CIV, 2008 WL 4999175, at *7 (S.D. Fla. 
Nov. 20, 2008). The court noted its inability to sanction the protective-order violation pursuant to its 
inherent authority due to a lack of bad faith. Id. 
 117. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). The Rules Enabling Act was an Act of Congress that gave the judicial 
branch the power to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The Supreme Court appointed 
the Advisory Committee to draft what would become the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1935, and 
since 1958 the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has been in charge of drafting revisions to the rules. 
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provided an explanatory note with each new rule and amendment.118 
These notes serve many purposes: they indicate the purpose of the 
amendment or rule,119 they help guide future interpretation,120 they 
provide practice tips,121 and they discuss the rule or amendment’s 
relation to existing law.122 The notes on the 1970 Amendments to 
Rule 37 comment that a variety of rules authorize orders for 
discovery, including Rule 26(c).123 The notes further state that “[t]he 
scope of Rule 37(b)(2) is broadened by extending it to include any 
order which ‘provide[s] or permit[s] discovery,’” and Rule 37(b)(2) 
sanctions “should provide comprehensively for enforcement of all 
these orders.”124 
The Eleventh Circuit disagrees with the Advisory Committee Note 
suggestions.125 Focusing on the specific rule language—”fails to 
obey an order to provide or permit discovery”—the court interprets 
the text to exclude protective discovery orders.126 The Eleventh 
Circuit interprets the Advisory Committee Note’s language to mean 
that Rule 37(b) should only apply to orders “for discovery” and finds 
                                                                                                                 
4 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1001 (3d ed. 1998). 
 118. Struve, supra note 37, at 1112. 
 119. Id. at 1112 & n.41 (citing the Advisory Committee notes for Rules 4, 26, 30, 33, 45, 53, 77 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where the notes indicate the general purpose for each amendment). 
 120. Id. at 1112 & n.42 (“Paragraph (a)(1) articulates the standard for the granting of a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law. It effects no change in the existing standard” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 
Advisory Committee notes (1991))). 
 121. Id. at 1113 & n.44 (providing examples of how the committee notes offer practice tips). 
 122. Id. at 1112–13 & n.43 (citing Rule 11 Advisory Committee’s note (1993) (discussing the Rule’s 
relationship to courts’ inherent powers); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 Advisory Committee’s note (1993) (same); 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 Advisory Committee’s note (2000) (same)). 
 123. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 Advisory Committee’s note (1970). “The scope of Rule 37(b)(2) is broadened 
by extending it to include any order ‘to provide or permit discovery . . . .” The note specifically 
references Rule 26(c), Rule 35, and Rules 37(a) and (d). Id. “Rule 37(b)(2) should provide 
comprehensively for enforcement of all these orders.” Id. Furthermore, “Rule 37 authorizes the court to 
direct that parties or attorneys who fail to participate in good faith in the discovery process pay the 
expenses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred by other parties as a result of that failure.” Id. at 1980 
Amendment. 
 124. Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 
Advisory Committee’s note); see also Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et 
Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958) (“Rule 37 provides more expansive coverage 
by comprehending disobedience of production orders by any party.”). 
 125. Fitzsimmons, supra note 24, at 287–88. 
 126. Lipscher, 266 F.3d at 1323 (emphasis added) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)). 
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that a Rule 26(c) protective order instead prevents and limits 
discovery, and therefore, falls outside the scope of Rule 37(b).127 
In the Eleventh Circuit, parties who violate protective orders are 
sanctioned only if the court finds the violation was made in bad 
faith.128 This is not an impossible hurdle. The Middle District of 
Florida invoked its inherent authority to sanction an attorney in a 
products liability suit who willfully violated a protective order by 
providing confidential materials to unauthorized persons; the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the imposed sanctions of nearly $14,000 
for acting in bad faith.129 Similarly, the District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia imposed sanctions against a bank and its 
counsel for “secretly soliciting exclusion requests from potential 
members” of the plaintiff class in violation of a protective order.130 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the validity of a $50,000 sanction 
along with the disqualification of lead counsel, relying heavily upon 
counsel’s direct and willful advice to violate the court order.131 This 
decision evidences the possibility of obtaining sanctions in the 
Eleventh Circuit, but the question is whether, due to the higher 
threshold of violative behavior required for the courts to sanction 
under inherent authority, it should be more difficult to do so. Other 
jurisdictions determine that the standard for sanctioning protective 
order violations should not require bad faith and instead apply Rule 
37 to these situations.132 The fundamental disagreement “revolves 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) Advisory Committee’s note). The court notes that a 
protective order is a restraint on discovery and in no way permits or provides discovery. Id. 
 128. See id. at 1320; Mitchell Co., Inc. v. Campus, No. 07-0177-KD-C, 2009 WL 3110367, at *1 
(S.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2009) (noting that due to a lack of the required finding of bath faith, the court was 
unable to sanction using its inherent authority); see also Valdez-Castillo v. Busch Entm’t Corp., No. 06-
20772-CIV, 2008 WL 4999175, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2008) (commenting on its inability to 
disregard the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Lipscher). 
 129. McDonald v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 186 F. App’x 930, 931 (11th Cir. 2006). Courts have 
inherent authority and power to impose sanctions for failure to comply with a court order, including a 
court order of protection. See Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir. 
1985). 
 130. Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1196. 
 131. Id. at 1199. 
 132. See, e.g., Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 488–89 (5th Cir. 
2012); Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 784 (9th Cir. 1983); Trenado v. 
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 274 F.R.D. 598, 600 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Mitchell Co., 2009 WL 3110367, at 
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around whether Rule 26(c) protective orders are orders that ‘provide 
or permit discovery.’”133 
In Lipscher v. LRP Publications, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held 
that Rule 37(b)(2) does not authorize the courts to impose sanctions 
for accidental or purposeful violations of protective orders,134 
reasoning that a protective order is not technically “an order to 
provide or permit discovery.”135 In Lipscher, LRP was granted a 
protective order instructing Law Bulletin to return documents related 
to LRP’s use of Law Bulletin’s third-party jury verdict 
publications.136 Law Bulletin’s legal counsel—Kehoe and Lipscher—
failed to return all the documents subject to the protective order and 
were sanctioned by the district court pursuant to Rule 37.137 On 
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed LRP’s award of reasonable 
attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses in connection with the motion for 
sanctions based upon their narrow interpretation of Rule 37 and its 
applicability to Rule 26(c) protective orders.138 Despite incurring 
nearly $8,000 in additional costs in fighting Lipscher’s violation, 
LRP received no compensation as a result of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision.139 The court did, however, acknowledge that had the district 
court invoked its inherent authority, LRP may have been 
compensated.140 
Many courts question the Eleventh Circuit’s narrow application of 
Rule 37(b), holding that federal courts are authorized by the Federal 
Rules to impose sanctions for disobeying a discovery order.141 Even 
                                                                                                                 
*1–2. But see Valdez-Castillo, 2008 WL 4999175, at *6–7. 
 133. Fitzsimmons, supra note 24, at 286. 
 134. See Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 135. Id. (citing Coleman v. Am. Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1098–99 (6th Cir. 1994) (Ryan, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that Rule 37(b) does not apply to Rule 26(c) protective orders)). 
 136. Id. at 1309, 1321–22. 
 137. Id. at 1321–22. 
 138. Id. at 1323. 
 139. See id. at 1322–23. 
 140. See Lipscher, 266 F.3d at 1323. 
 141. A survey of the federal circuit courts revealed that the Eleventh Circuit stands alone in its narrow 
interpretation of Rule 37(b)’s applicability to 26(c) protective orders. Trenado v. Cooper Tire & Rubber 
Co., 274 F.R.D. 598, 600 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (“The court agrees with the many other courts that have 
concluded that attorney’s fees and costs, as well as other appropriate sanctions, may be awarded under 
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lower courts within the Eleventh Circuit seem to question the logic of 
disallowing Rule 37(b) sanctions for violating protective orders.142 
For example, in Valdez-Castillo v. Busch Entertainment Corp., the 
Southern District of Florida stated that “[i]t may not be entirely 
obvious . . . why Rule 26(c) protective orders do not enjoy the 
protections of Rule 37(b) while other discovery orders . . . do, since 
an agreed protective order may be viewed as allowing discovery to 
proceed.”143 The court further noted that although the plaintiff’s 
actions admittedly violated the court order, the court was unable to 
impose sanctions using its inherent authority due to a lack of the 
requisite bad faith or willful misconduct.144 Notably, the district court 
warned that repeated violations of court orders would support a 
finding of bad faith.145 The Eleventh Circuit is alone in its narrow 
                                                                                                                 
Rule 37(b)(2) for a violation of a protective order.”); Schiller v. City of New York, No. 04 CIV. 
7921KMK/JCF, 2007 WL 1623108, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2007). “Rule 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure provides for sanctions for the violation of discovery orders.” Schiller, 2007 WL 
1623108, at *3. Coleman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 221 F.R.D. 433, 435–36 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (“If a 
party believes that the limitations set by the court have been violated, then the party may petition the 
court to invoke sanctions on the violating party.”). “A violation of a protective order may result in 
sanctions, including sanctions arising from the court’s inherent powers.” Static Control Components, 
Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, 201 F.R.D. 431, 436 (M.D.N.C. 2001); Violation of a protective order, by 
disseminating information designated as highly confidential, is appropriately sanctioned pursuant to 
Rule 37(b). CornerStone Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. James, No. C 12-1527 RS, 2014 WL 310089, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014); Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 267 F.R.D. 257, 264 (D. Minn. 
2007) (“Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for sanctions for the violation of 
discovery orders, which include protective orders issued under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).”); 
Lewis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 02-CV-0944 CVE-FHM, 2006 WL 1892583, at *3 (N.D. Okla. July 
10, 2006) (“Sanctions set forth in [Rule] 37(b)(2) are available for a violation of a protective order 
entered pursuant to [Rule] 26(c).”). 
 142. See discussion supra Part II. 
 143. Valdez-Castillo v. Busch Entm’t Corp., No. 06-20772-CIV, 2008 WL 4999175, at *6 (S.D. Fla. 
Nov. 20, 2008). The motel housekeeper in Valdez-Castillo sued the defendant after she was injured by 
the defendant’s monkeys, reptiles, and birds kept in defendant’s hotel rooms. Id. at *1. Plaintiff’s 
attorney obtained the defendant’s travel protocol and released it to a local newspaper; the newspaper 
published a front-page story about the case and reproduced excerpts of the protocol. Id. at *2. Plaintiff’s 
attorney realized his mistake and took all necessary corrective steps. Id. at *3, *5. The court noted the 
discovery order violation was “borne of inexperience” and was neither willful nor malicious, yet still 
considered Rule 37 sanctions. Id. at *5. The court was unable to impose sanctions based upon binding 
decisions by the Eleventh Circuit holding that Rule 37(b) sanctions are inapplicable to Rule 26(c) 
violations. Id. at *6. 
 144. Id. at *7. 
 145. See id. The court noted that in spite of its inability to sanction the protective-order violations, it 
took these violations “very seriously” and would “have much more difficulty finding a lack of bad faith” 
after a repeat violation. Id. 
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interpretation of Rule 37’s applicability to protective order 
violations.146 
Choosing to broadly interpret the rule’s language, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals construes a protective order to provide or permit 
discovery and thus finds that the court has authority to impose 
sanctions for violation of the order.147 The Fifth Circuit recently held 
that Rule 37(b)(2) does encompass protective orders, awarding 
sanctions where counsel inadvertently violated the court’s protective 
order by copying confidential information onto discs and 
disseminating them to attorneys attending a conference.148 
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit noted that the protective order set clear 
instructions on when and how to provide and receive confidential 
information; the court reasoned that “by prescribing the method and 
terms” of discovery, “the Protective Order was granted to ‘provide or 
permit discovery’ . . . within the meaning of Rule 37(b).”149 In Smith 
& Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Texas awarded sanctions to 
deter future willful violations and to “reflect the seriousness of such 
[protective] orders.”150 
The Fifth Circuit is not alone in its broad interpretation of Rule 
37(b).151 In Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., the Ninth 
Circuit similarly held that a failure to obey a protective order did 
result in liability for any reasonable resulting costs and attorney’s 
fees.152 The court noted that the burden of showing the existence of 
any special circumstances to substantially justify non-compliance 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See, e.g., Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 2012); 
Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 784 (9th Cir. 1983); Trenado, 274 F.R.D. 
at 600. 
 147. See, e.g., Trenado, 274 F.R.D. at 600. 
 148. Smith & Fuller, 685 F.3d at 487. 
 149. Id. at 490 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)). 
 150. Id. at 488. 
 151. See, e.g., Falstaff Brewing Corp., 702 F.2d at 784; see also Frazier v. Layne Christensen Co., 
No. 04-C-315-C, 2005 WL 372253, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 11, 2005). 
 152. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 702 F.2d at 772, 776, 784 (holding that counsel’s failure to obey a 
protective order, by failing to locate and destroy the original and duplicate protected documents, did 
create liability for any reasonable resulting costs and attorney’s fees, reasoning that the inability to 
locate confidential discovery materials called into question the “integrity of the discovery process”). 
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with protective orders lies with the sanctioned party.153 In United 
States v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc., the Ninth Circuit upheld 
the district court’s sanctions, holding that the authority to issue 
sanctions is subject to only two limitations: “(1) the sanction must be 
just; and (2) the sanction must specifically relate to the particular 
claim at issue in the order.”154 
District Courts within the Ninth Circuit continue to impose 
sanctions for discovery order violations and do so pursuant to Rule 
37.155 In LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Technologies, LLC, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
found LifeScan’s conduct sanctionable under Rule 37 and ordered 
the company to pay the defendants more than $40,000 in attorney’s 
fees after LifeScan learned the identity of the defendants’ distributors 
from protected material and then alerted those distributors as to 
pending legal actions.156 The Central District of California went as 
far as dismissing a suit with prejudice following two deliberate 
violations of a protective order, finding that no other sanction would 
“ensure the orderly administration of justice.”157 The Ninth Circuit 
further determined that Rule 37(b) sanctions must be compensatory 
in that they reimburse only for “actual losses.”158 
While the Seventh Circuit has not considered the issue of Rule 
37(b)’s application to Rule 26(c) protective orders, lower courts in 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Id. at 784 (citing David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 419 (9th Cir. 1977)). 
 154. United States v. Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 910 (9th Cir. 1986) (imposing 
compensatory sanctions, including attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with the motions 
filed, against the government for violating the spirit of the protective order and for attempting to 
influence witnesses and the litigation outcome). 
 155. CornerStone Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. James, No. C 12-1527 RS, 2014 WL 310089, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 28, 2014); LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, No. 11-CV-04494-WHO, 2013 WL 
5949629, at * 7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2013); Life Techs. Corp. v. Biosearch Techs., Inc., No. C-12-00852 
WHA JCS, 2012 WL 1600393, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2012). 
 156. LifeScan Scotland, Ltd., 2013 WL 5949629, at *7. 
 157. Hi-Tek Bags, Ltd. v. Bobtron Int’l, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 379, 383–84 (C.D. Cal. 1992). “This Court’s 
Protective Order is clearly an order justified pursuant to [Rule] 26(c) and is therefore certainly a violated 
‘order’ within the scope of [Rule] 37(b). As such, Hi–Tek’s second series of violations of this Court’s 
Protective Order triggers the availability of sanctions pursuant to [Rule] 37(b)(2).” Id. (quoting G-K 
Props. v. Redev. Agency of San Jose, 577 F.2d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
 158. Nat’l Med. Enters., 792 F.2d at 910 (quoting Shuffler v. Heritage Bank, 720 F.2d 1141, 1148 
(9th Cir. 1983)). 
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the Seventh Circuit regularly award sanctions for violations of Rule 
26(c) protective orders.159 In 2013, the Northern District of Illinois, 
Eastern Division acknowledged the “disagreement about whether 
[the] language of Rule 37(b)(2) encompasses violations of a 
protective order” but ultimately concluded that Rule 37(b) is 
applicable to protective order violations, citing the 1970 Advisory 
Committee notes.160 The Eastern Division also held that Rule 37 
supported sanctions equal to attorney’s fees and expenses where a 
financial company violated a court protective order by disseminating 
highly confidential and protected information.161 The Eastern 
Division further noted that it was not necessary to show more than a 
“mere” violation of the protective order.162 In Whitehead v. Gateway 
Chevrolet, the Eastern Division again imposed sanctions pursuant to 
Rule 37 upon a party that violated a protective order.163 Whitehead 
based her case upon confidential and protected information, to which 
her attorney was privy while engaged in prior litigation with different 
clients; the court fined the attorney more than $15,000, noting the 
flagrant violation warranted sanctions pursuant to both Rule 37 and 
the court’s inherent authority.164 
In Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., the United States District Court 
for the District of Maine awarded reasonable attorney’s fees, costs 
associated with bringing motions related to the violation, and 
permitted recovery for any other reasonable expenses incurred as a 
result of the violation where counsel assisted a third party in 
obtaining the protected material for use in another case against the 
same defendant.165 Similarly, the Western District of Wisconsin 
                                                                                                                 
 159. See Whitehead v. Gateway Chevrolet, Oldsmobile, No. 03 C 5684, 2004 WL 1459478, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. June 29, 2004). 
 160. Instant Tech., LLC v. DeFazio, No. 12 C 491, 2013 WL 5966893, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2013). 
 161. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago ex rel. Emerald Invs. LP v. AXA Client Solutions, LLC, 
No. 00 C 6786, 2002 WL 1067696, at *1, *3, *7 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2002) (granting motions for 
sanctions, including attorney’s fees and expenses incurred from investigating violations of the protective 
order.), aff’d, 2002 WL 1838144 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2002). 
 162. See id. at *3. 
 163. Whitehead, 2004 WL 1459478, at *5. 
 164. Id. at *4–5. 
 165. Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 29, 30, 33 (D. Me. 1994). 
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imposed sanctions on plaintiffs for an unintentional harmless 
violation to both deter similar future behavior and shift imposed 
costs.166 The Eastern District of North Carolina, Western Division, 
held that Rule 37(b) sanctions are available to the courts when a party 
violates a protective order.167 
IV.   WHAT GOOD IS HAVING A MUZZLED AND CAGED GUARD DOG? 
Court orders for discovery protection offer no real protection for 
parties to litigation in the Eleventh Circuit. Undoubtedly, courts 
should employ a coherent limiting principle regarding the application 
of Rule 37.168 This Note does not advocate Rule 37(b) sanctions for 
all protective order violations, nor does it recommend sanctions for 
minor negligent or accidental violations related to discovery 
orders.169 Instead, this Note proposes that Eleventh Circuit courts join 
other federal courts and levy Rule 37’s power to sanction—where 
“just”170—negligent and inadvertent violations of those protective 
orders that serve to either limit or encourage a party to provide or 
protect documents and information during discovery. Imposing 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Frazier v. Layne Christensen Co., No. 04-C-315-C, 2005 WL 372253, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 11, 
2005). Counsel for the Plaintiff claims that due to the pressures and responsibilities of the case, she 
forgot to obtain pre-approval of their experts prior to disclosing protected information. Id. at *2. 
 167. SAS Inst. Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., No. 5:10-CV-25-FL, 2014 WL 1760960, at *6–7 
(E.D.N.C. May 1, 2014). World Programming provided a highly confidential list of its customers to 
SAS and marked it “Highly Confidential—Attorneys’ Eyes Only.” Id. at * 2. SAS then shared the 
customer list with unauthorized SAS employees. Id. SAS further violated a court protective order when 
they filed a “Highly Confidential” document gained during discovery with the court and when SAS’s 
counsel disclosed confidential information to a deponent who had not signed the required confidentiality 
agreement. Id. at *3. 
 168. Josephs, supra note 29, at 1371. “Without a coherent limiting principle, any order issued before 
or during discovery, no matter how unrelated to the discovery process, may potentially be seen as 
somehow affecting discovery.” Id. 
 169. Disciplinary sanctions under discovery rules are intended to perform three vital functions: (1) 
ensure a party does not benefit from its failure to comply, (2) specifically deter and seek 
compliance, and (3) serve as a general deterrent in both the case at hand and other litigation. Burnett v. 
Venturi, 903 F. Supp. 304, 308 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (citing Update Art, Inc., v. Modiin Publ’g, Ltd., 843 
F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
 170. Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Sanctions Available Under Rule 37, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Other than Exclusion of Expert Testimony, for Failure to Obey Discovery Order Not Related 
to Expert Witness, 156 A.L.R. Fed. 601 (1999). “A district court is also permitted under Rule 37 to enter 
any order that is ‘just.’” Id. 
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sanctions for both negligent and inadvertent discovery protective 
order violations pursuant to Rule 37(b) would provide certainty, 
consistency, and protection for parties before the Court.171 
Provided that the sole authority by which violations may be 
punished within the Eleventh Circuit is pursuant to the court’s 
inherent authority,172 protective order violations receive markedly 
different treatment when compared to other discovery order 
violations.173 There is no obvious or touted good reason to require an 
increased standard for protective orders. Similarly, there is no 
practical reason to exempt non-purposeful protective order violations 
from punishment and deterrence. 
If an attorney’s conduct unreasonably causes a delay or increases 
case complexity, yet falls short of technically violating Federal Rules 
governing discovery sanctions, theoretically the court may require 
the attorney to pay opposing attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 
§ 1927.174 This would, however, require detailed findings of bad 
faith, and notably § 1927 has not yet been used to punish protective 
order violations.175 Reliance upon the court’s inherent authority is 
similarly limited in that clear detailed findings of bad faith are 
required—an “extremely high” standard of imposition.176 Rule 37 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See discussion supra Part III. 
 172. Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 173. See Bratka v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 164 F.R.D. 448, 463 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (finding default 
judgment warranted where employer demonstrates gross negligence and fails to produce documents, 
prolongs litigation, and multiplies the cost and expense for plaintiff and the court); see also Arista 
Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 140–141 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that 
sanctions for failure to make disclosures or to cooperate in discovery require a mere showing of 
violation of a court order); BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 12 F.3d 1045, 1046, 
1050 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding award of Rule 37 sanctions against both the law firm and client for 
withholding evidence in violation of discovery order); R. De Bouard & Cie. v. S. S. Ionic Coast, 46 
F.R.D. 1, 2–3 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (awarding costs and attorney’s fees where plaintiff was forced to compel 
answers to interrogatories and file a motion for default judgment). 
 174. Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 148 F.R.D. 362, 372 (S.D. Ga. 1991), aff’d, 987 F.2d 1536 
(11th Cir. 1993). 
 175. Westlaw search performed Nov. 5, 2013: no cases report a court’s imposition of sanctions for the 
discovery of a protective order pursuant to § 1927. 
 176. Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 722–23 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he standard for the imposition 
of sanctions using the court’s inherent powers is extremely high. The court must find that the ‘very 
temple of justice has been defiled’ by the party’s conduct.” (quoting Boland Marine & Mfg. Co. v. 
Rihner, 41 F.3d 997, 1005 (5th Cir. 1995))). 
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may very well be the sole source of protection for court-order 
protected material that is inadvertently or negligently disseminated or 
destroyed in violation of a court protective order.177 This Note 
suggests expanding the application of Rule 37 sanctions to include 
situations where parties divulge or provide information in reliance on 
the court’s protection where the court’s protective order permits, 
provides, encourages, or even simply streamlines discovery. 
A.   Listen to the Breeder: Follow the Advice of the Advisory 
Committee Notes 
The Eleventh Circuit should give considerable weight to the 
recommendations of the Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 37 
because, although not binding, they do provide a sort of “legislative 
history.”178 Interpretations provided within the Advisory Committee 
Notes accompanying Federal Rules amendments, “[a]lthough not 
binding . . . ’are nearly universally accorded great weight in 
interpreting federal rules.’”179 The Supreme Court has turned to the 
Advisory Committee Notes to determine a federal rule’s purpose.180 
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit courts routinely look to the 
Advisory Committee for guidance, logic, and intent.181 Since the 
1960s, the notes have increased in volume and significance and “now 
play an integral role in the rulemaking process.”182 The notes provide 
                                                                                                                 
 177. See supra Part I. 
 178. Brief for Petitioner at n.31, Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’n Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533 
(1991) (No. 89-1500), 1990 WL 505671, at *24. 
 179. Horenkamp v. Van Winkle and Co., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Vergis v. 
Grand Victoria Casino & Resort, 199 F.R.D. 216, 218 (S.D. Ohio 2000)). 
 180. See, e.g., Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 550–51 (2010) (interpreting Federal 
Rule 15(c)). 
 181. Hill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 961 F.2d 153, 155 (11th Cir. 1992) (focusing on the intent for the 
Federal Rule’s amendment as stated by the Advisory Committee notes). “[I]t would be inequitable for 
this Court to ignore the intent of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the United States Supreme 
Court, and Congress by deciding this issue based on the requirements of a soon to be obsolete rule of 
civil procedure.” Id. (quoting Boliden Metech, Inc. v. United States, 140 F.R.D. 254, 258 (D.R.I. 1991)); 
see also Sundale Assocs., v. City Nat’l Bank of Miami (In re Sundale) 786 F.2d 1456, 1458 (11th Cir. 
1986) (“Advisory Committee chose certainty . . . and its choice should not be overridden . . . .”). 
 182. Struve, supra note 37, at 1112. 
28
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss2/5
2015] REMOVE THE MUZZLE AND GIVE RULE 37(b) TEETH 435 
insight into a Rule’s purpose and assist in its interpretation.183 
Furthermore, the Advisory Committee carries with it “the great 
prestige that the individual members of the successive Committees, 
and the Committees themselves, have enjoyed as authorities on 
procedure.”184 
The Advisory Committee commented specifically upon Rule 37’s 
broadened scope, explicitly mentioning its applicability to Rule 
26(c).185 The Committee went on to advise that Rule 37(b)(2) 
“should provide comprehensively for the enforcement of all these” 
orders for discovery and should be used to provide for payment of 
costs incurred due to a failure to obey a discovery order.186 
Admittedly the notes following Rule 26’s 1970 amendment state 
specifically that responsive protective orders, orders to permit or 
provide discovery following the denial of a motion for protection, 
bring Rule 37(b) sanctions into play.187 The notes are not exhaustive, 
however, and the mere fact that Rule 26’s Notes specifically mention 
Rule 37’s applicability to Rule 26(c)(2) orders does not preclude 
Rule 37’s application to Rule 26(c)(1) orders.188 Quite the opposite, 
in fact—the reference to the rule reinforces the Committee’s 
endorsement of Rule 37 sanctions for violations of protective 
discovery orders and confirms that 26(c) protective orders do in fact 
“provide or permit discovery.”189 
B.   Viciously Mauled or Accidentally Bitten: Is the Harm Really That 
Different for Protective Order Violations Compared with Other 
Discovery Order Violations? 
Federal Rule 26(c) provides that “[t]he court may, for good cause, 
issue an order to protect a party . . . from annoyance, 
                                                                                                                 
 183. Id. at 1112–13. 
 184. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 178, at n. 31. 
 185. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 Advisory Committee’s note (1993). 
 186. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 Advisory Committee’s note (1970). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Josephs, supra note 29, at 1376. 
 189. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) Advisory Committee’s note (1970)). 
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embarrassment, . . . or undue burden or expense.”190 The 
determination of good cause rests upon a balance of seven factors 
focused upon the importance of the information, ease of obtaining 
substantially similar information from other sources, and party 
resources.191 Parties who successfully obtain court-ordered protection 
meet the substantial burden of demonstrating that disclosure would 
result in a “clearly defined and very serious injury.”192 Furthermore, 
protective orders can “‘only be enforced through a motion for 
sanctions,’” increasing the cost and burden upon the violated party.193 
Sanction motions do not address the merits of the case, reflect 
animosity between counsel, and increase litigation costs.194 As a 
result, most judges dislike sanctions motions.195 However, in light of 
a court-acknowledged potential injury or harm to the movant, courts 
should swallow their distaste for sanctions motions, add some bite to 
the court’s bark, and sanction the violating party to deter, 
compensate, and punish. 
Arguably, the types of harm caused by protective order violations 
are not markedly different from injuries caused by other discovery 
order violations, and to the extent they are different, the harms may 
be greater. Protective orders induce the production of confidential 
information, and even trade secrets.196 Parties rely upon the 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (emphasis added). 
 191. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) Advisory Committee’s note (2006); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, 720 
F. Supp. 2d 587, 618 (D.N.J. 2010). The seven factors include: 
(1) the specificity of the discovery request; [(2)] the quantity of information available 
from other and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant 
information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available on more easily 
accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that 
cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the 
importance and usefulness of further information; (6) the importance of the issues at 
stake in the litigation; and (7) the parties’ resources. 
Major Tours, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 2d at 618. 
 192. Citicorp v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 478 F. Supp. 756, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting United States 
v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). 
 193. In re John Adams Assocs., 255 F.R.D. 7, 9 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Newman & Holtzinger, P.C., 992 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 194. Pepe, supra note 54, at 27. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Cooper 
produced thousands of pages of trade secrets or confidential information in reliance on the Protective 
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protection offered by court orders, expecting the court to punish the 
nefarious or incompetent.197 Imagine how badly Coca-Cola would 
suffer if its secret formulae and ingredient lists, known as 
“Merchandise 7X,” were disclosed to competitors.198 Importantly, 
“damage to a corporation’s goodwill or reputation generally is not 
sufficient to establish a need for confidentiality”; the harm must be 
more concrete.199 For example, violation of the protective order in 
Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank could have compromised the bank’s 
security protocols, leaving client records and money vulnerable.200 In 
another case, disclosure of a trade secret manufacturing process and 
formula for production may have resulted in a loss of a business 
advantage,201 and disclosure of a patent-pending device in another 
case had the potential to result in the unauthorized use of a 
proprietary trade secret and ultimately extreme financial loss.202 The 
release of operations records would allow competitors to examine a 
manufacturer’s capabilities and impact price competitiveness.203 
Preventing a plaintiff from disseminating a political candidate’s 
deposition had the potential to prevent embarrassment to the 
candidate.204 A protective court order restricts and governs 
disclosure, but it also signals that the possible “risk of harm to the 
owner of the trade secret or confidential information outweighs the 
                                                                                                                 
Order.”). 
 197. Id. at 489. 
 198. See generally Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc.. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288 (D. 
Del. 1985). The complete formula for Coca-Cola, one of the best-kept trade secrets in the world, is 
known by two people within the company. Id. at 289. Bottling companies brought action against Coca-
Cola to determine whether a new diet cola was covered by a bottling syrup pricing contract. Id. at 290. 
The bottlers sought discovery of the secret formulae of several cola products. Id. at 291–92. The district 
court held that the formulas were subject to discovery but were protected by strict safeguards intended to 
prevent disclosure to Coke’s competitors. Id. at 300. 
 199. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 Harv. 
L. Rev. 427, 435 (1991). 
 200. See Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank, N.A., 211 F. Supp. 2d 447, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 201. See DDS, Inc. v. Lucas Aerospace Power Transmission Corp., 182 F.R.D. 1, 5 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 202. See Wainwright v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 163 F.R.D. 391, 397 (D.D.C. 1995). 
 203. See Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 112, 114–15 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 204. See Flaherty v. Seroussi, 209 F.R.D. 295, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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need for discovery.”205 The risks are real. The harms are often 
irreversible. 
Although the harms occur whether disclosure was inadvertent or 
intentional, the harms suffered by negligent or inadvertent violation 
of other discovery orders are often less severe than the long-term 
effects of a violated protective order.206 Sanctions pursuant to Rule 
37 are endorsed for non-protective order discovery violations and 
examples abound in the federal system.207 For example, delayed 
disclosure of additional witnesses prolongs discovery and inflicts 
additional costs; this behavior can be sanctioned under Rule 37.208 
Failure to comply with a broad discovery order for the production of 
criminal history has warranted sanctions to attempt to prevent the 
violating party from benefiting from its noncompliance.209 
Furthermore, Rule 37 explicitly provides that sanctions are available 
for violation of the discovery conference orders210 and orders to 
submit for a physical or mental examination.211 
It seems illogical to think the Supreme Court and Congress 
intended that a party’s failure to submit for a medical exam or obey 
an order to answer interrogatories should warrant sanctions pursuant 
to Rule 37, but they did not intend to extend sanction-protection to 
failure to obey a protective order. This assumption is illogical, 
especially considering the heavy burden moving parties shoulder 
prior to the award of a protective order. Perhaps this inclination is 
one reason the Eleventh Circuit is currently standing alone without 
the support of the remaining Federal Circuits. 
                                                                                                                 
 205. Miller, supra note 199, at 434. 
 206. See supra Part III. 
 207. See supra Part III. 
 208. See e360 Insight, Inc. v. Spamhaus Project, 658 F.3d 637, 642–43 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 209. See Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs., L.P., 154 F.R.D. 87, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 210. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). 
 211. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vii). 
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C.   Is the Eleventh Circuit the Alpha Dog if Other Federal Circuit 
Courts Don’t Follow and Lower Courts Question the Eleventh 
Circuit’s Narrow Interpretation? 
The Eleventh Circuit Court’s decision in Lipscher rests upon a 
novel interpretation of Rule 37(b), mainly that protective orders 
neither provide nor permit discovery.212 The narrow interpretation is 
limited to the Eleventh Circuit;213 the 2001 decision has neither 
influenced nor limited Rule 37’s applicability to protective orders 
within other federal circuits.214 District courts outside the Eleventh 
Circuit continue to sanction for protective order violations.215 The 
District Court of Arizona interprets Federal Rule 37(b) to authorize a 
district court to sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order, 
including a discovery protective order.216 The Northern District of 
Illinois considers the issue settled, applies Rule 37 to Rule 26(c), and 
disregards the Eleventh Circuit’s narrow interpretation.217 The 
Western District of New York finds Rule 37 to be applicable to all 
discovery orders, regardless of willfulness or negligence.218 
Notably, even District Courts within the Eleventh Circuit question 
the narrow reading to which they are bound and desire the ability to 
impose sanctions for both negligent and inadvertent protective order 
violations.219 The Southern District of Alabama was unable to 
                                                                                                                 
 212. Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
37(b)(2)). 
 213. See supra Part III. 
 214. See, e.g., Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 784 (9th Cir. 1983); 
Trenado v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 274 F.R.D. 598, 600 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 
 215. See, e.g., Frazier v. Layne Christensen Co., No. 04-C-315-C, 2005 WL 372253, at *4 (W.D. 
Wis. Feb. 11, 2005); Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago ex rel. Emerald Inv. LP v. AXA Client 
Solutions, LLC, No. 00 C 6786, 2002 WL 1067696, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2012), aff’d, 2002 WL 
1838144 (N.D. Ill Aug. 12, 2002). 
 216. Lambright v. Ryan, No. CV-87-235-TUC-JMR, 2010 WL 1780878, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 4, 
2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 698 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 217. Whitehead v. Gateway Chevrolet, Oldsmobile, No. 03 C 5684, 2004 WL 1459478, at *3–4 (N.D. 
Ill. June 29, 2004). 
 218. Blum v. Schlegel, No. 91-CV-633S, 1996 WL 925921, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. May 9, 1996), aff’d, 
108 F.3d 1369 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 219. Mitchell Co. v. Campus, No. 07-0177-KD-C, 2009 WL 3110367, at *1–2 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 
2009). In Mitchell, Plaintiff failed to return protected documents despite clear directives from the court 
order. Id. The district court noted that due to a lack of the required finding of bath faith, the court was 
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sanction a party for failure to return protected documents, though the 
court probably would have, but for the binding decision in 
Lipscher.220 The Southern District of Florida noted that despite 
possible deservedness, it was unable to sanction a violating party in 
the absence of bad faith.221 
CONCLUSION 
Federal Rule 37 currently authorizes courts to sanction certain 
types of discovery abuse for the purposes of: (1) penalizing the 
culpable party or attorney; (2) deterring others from engaging in 
similar conduct; (3) compensating the court and other parties for the 
expense caused by the abusive conduct; and (4) compelling discovery 
and disclosure.222 The Eleventh Circuit has split from the remaining 
Federal Circuit Courts in its interpretation of Rule 37(b)’s 
applicability to Rule 26(c) protective orders. The Eleventh Circuit 
stands alone in allowing parties who inadvertently or negligently 
violate protective orders to proceed unpunished. Its decision in 
Lipscher ultimately means that, absent clearly detailed findings (clear 
and convincing evidence) of bad faith, negligent or accidental 
protective order violations will go unpunished.223 
The court’s decision in Lipscher “staked out a novel claim on the 
issue” but the decision has not influenced courts within other 
circuits.224 Even district courts within the Eleventh Circuit bemoan 
                                                                                                                 
unable to sanction using its inherent authority. Id. The court then went on to say, “[u]nfortunately, the 
Court appears to be without any power to impose . . . attorneys’ fees [because that option] is foreclosed 
by [Lipscher].” Id. See also Valdez-Castillo v. Busch Entm’t Corp., No. 06-20772-CIV, 2008 WL 
4999175, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2008) (commenting on the inconsistent application of Rule 37(b) 
protections and its inability to stray from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision in Lipscher). 
 220. Mitchell Co., 2009 WL 3110367, at *1–2. 
 221. Valdez-Castillo, 2008 WL 4999175, at *6. 
 222. Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 775 F.2d 1440, 1453 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Nat’l Hockey 
League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976); Brown v. Tellermate Holdings Ltd., No. 
2:11-CV-1122, 2014 WL 2987051, at *25 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2014). 
 223. Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001) (violating party escaped 
sanctions though they failed to return competitor’s documents involving dealings with third parties, 
which were protected under the court order). 
 224. See, e.g., Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 2012); 
 
34
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss2/5
2015] REMOVE THE MUZZLE AND GIVE RULE 37(b) TEETH 441 
their lack of authority to impose sanctions for negligent or 
inadvertent protective order violations.225 Moreover, district courts 
outside of the Eleventh Circuit continue to sanction for violations of 
protective orders.226 It is clear the Eleventh Circuit stands alone, and 
for the aforementioned reasons it should rejoin the pack and impose 
sanctions for protective order violations pursuant to Rule 37. 
                                                                                                                 
Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 784 (9th Cir. 1983); Trenado v. Cooper 
Tire & Rubber Co., 274 F.R.D. 598, 599 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 
 225. See cases cited supra note 219. 
 226. See, e.g., Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago ex rel. Emerald Inv. LP v. AXA Client 
Solutions, LLC, No. 00 C 6786, 2002 WL 1067696, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2002), aff’d, 2002 WL 
1838144 (N.D. Ill Aug. 12, 2002); Frazier v. Layne Christensen Co., No. 04-C-315-C, 2005 WL 
372253, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 11, 2005). 
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